

The CPSU Document of 21 June 1960

1. The CPSU circular of 21 June consisted of ^{seventy}~~seventy-two~~ pages.

In an introductory section it outlined the history of the dispute in "recent" * years. In succeeding sections it analyzed and refuted the Chinese arguments, and it presented a bill of particulars on instances of Chinese violation of discipline.

2. Soviet views on the background of the dispute. The document stated that, despite a long history of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and the CPR, the Soviets noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take divergent positions on very important questions and that this ^{stand} threatened to disrupt good relations and the solidarity of the international movement. This was manifested in the Chinese articles ^{the anniversary of} on Lenin's birth anniversary in April, statements within the WFTU and other international organizations, and Chinese statements diverging from the 1957 Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto. The CPSU made no move against these Chinese statements, considering it necessary to hold a meeting to discuss them.

3. According to the Soviets, Chou En-lai told the Soviet Ambassador to China in January that the problem was essentially a Party matter and that he preferred not to discuss it.

* Excerpts set off in quotation marks in this account are taken from summary versions of the document and do not necessarily reflect the exact text of the original.

4. On 6 February 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU

proposed a discussion to resolve the differences. The Chinese refused to attend such a meeting and began publicizing their views.

5. At the time of the meeting of the General Council of the WFTU

in Peking in early June, the Chinese revealed to the Soviets their great dissatisfaction with CPSU positions and they also told other Communists of their attitude. On 2 June Liu Ning-yi told Grishin that the Chinese were very dissatisfied with the position of the WFTU on the question of peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yi said that "to sit down at the same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of all mankind". He warned Grishin that if the report of the WFTU were not changed, the Chinese would criticize the WFTU and expose its "right opportunism."

6. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning-yi presented views

that differed from the Soviet positions, the CPSU document charged. Then, at a supper and meeting to which the Chinese Politburo invited some delegates, Liu Shao-chi said that there were important differences of opinion among the Communist Parties. Teng Hsiao-p'ing then spoke on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors in the 20th Congress thesis on "peaceful coexistence" and of throwing overboard the Moscow Declaration-- at the same time, according to the CPSU document, as he himself contradicted the Moscow Declaration. He attacked Soviet efforts to negotiate with the

West as a "betrayal" of world Communism. Chou En-lai was going to speak, but the delegates asserted that they would not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs" of the Communist Parties.

7. The CPSU document criticized the Chinese methods as incorrect, unacceptable, and ^{opposed to} against proletarian internationalism. The Soviets had been informed by comrades of other Parties that the Chinese had many times asked for meetings and had been making known criticisms and disagreements going back to as early as 1956.

8. The Chinese said that because of the opposition expressed against their attitude, they would not speak in the WFTU sessions; but they nevertheless did so, even in discussion with non-Communist delegates.

Theⁿ the Chinese speakers at the WFTU meeting tried to impose the Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up against the CPSU.

9. In addition, the Soviet document charged, the Chinese were distributing "Long Live Leninism" and other critical articles within the Bloc, without the permission of the other CPs.

10. It is necessary to discuss the problems of the "character of the present epoch", "war and peace", "coexistence", and "road to socialism", the CPSU document states, because the "Communist movement does not see these problems clearly."

11. "Character of the present epoch." The document criticized as one-sided the Chinese characterization of the epoch as one of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese claim that any other attitude is a departure from Lenin's views. The CPSU believes that the Chinese fail to take into account the changes in the correlation of class forces and that they misunderstand and misinterpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese analysis is "incomplete" and that it conflicts with the Soviet characterization of the "epoch" as one also of "disintegration of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing further the well-established Soviet concepts in this regard, the document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch has "great fundamental importance", for from this definition are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and tactics, peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, war, peace, and disarmament."

12. Chinese claims that the CPSU has departed from Leninism in appraising the nature of "imperialism", but ^{Leninism is} this wrong. The document cited statements at the 20th and 21st Congress and by Khrushchev on his return from the U.S. and later, from France, to support the Soviet refutation of the Chinese charges.

13. War and Peace. At one time, the CPSU document said, the Chinese adhered to the Khrushchev thesis on peaceful coexistence. Lately, in the April articles and at the WFTU meeting, the Chinese have departed from this thesis. In Red Flag the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff", and not the Communists, could decide whether ~~there~~ would be war or peace, whether to launch local or general war, or whether to intervene abroad. This attitude is based on a wrong analysis of forces. The document reiterated the Soviet argument that war is not merely an economic phenomenon", but depends upon the correlation of forces, and that the forces of peace may be able to prevent the "imperialists" from resorting to war. The most "decisive" factor is the Communist camp.

14. To take the position that war is inevitable leads to "fatalism", "paralyzes the struggle", and "disarms the people." Events after the 20th Congress confirms the Soviet thesis. By 1965 "even the most rash imperialists will see war is impossible."

15. At the Moscow conference in 1957 Mao himself said that "Everything reduces itself to gaining fifteen years. Lasting peace will be assured throughout the world. " " Today, the Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists cannot be restrained. ^{Two CPSU} ~~was~~ however,

say that the imperialists should neither be over- or underestimated.

16. According to Chinese articles, whoever defends the thesis
[of averting war] is " 'opposed to wars of liberation' ". This is false.
Coexistence "does not mean renunciation of proletarian class war, or
of national liberation, including armed struggle." The contrary is true:
class struggle will increase once the threat of war has been eliminated.

17. The Chinese have persisted in their view that "as long as
imperialism exists... succession of periods of war and peace will be
permanent and inevitable." (The document cited Red Flag and Peoples
Peoples Daily.) At the WFTU meeting, Liu Chang-sheng said that it
was an "illusion" to think that there could be a world without wars and
without arms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session of the
WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee launched a polemic
against the ~~Peace~~ ^{manifesto} declaration which had been signed by "all" Parties,
including the Chinese.

18. The CPSU document declared that peaceful coexistence means
"gaining time" for the "consolidation of the Socialist system and the
acceleration of the building of socialism and Communism." The "Communist
Parties cannot permit society to be thrown back hundreds of years" and the
destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people.

19. It is impossible to accept the arguments of Red Flag: " ' We need

not fear war. Atom bombs are paper tigers [used by the imperialists] to subjugate people. The losses from war will be compensated by the victory of socialism."

20. The Soviet position, the CPSU document ¹⁸says, is that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, "even if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document cites Lenin in support of this policy.)

21. Coexistence, the Soviets assert, will encourage centrifugal forces within the "imperialist bloc" and will "sharpen contradictions" within "imperialist countries" and between them.

22. The Chinese say that coexistence means "class peace". This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist countries, between dependent and imperialist countries, or between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international level. It opens up possibilities for solidarity with the masses for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cites the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European CPs.)

23. The Chinese say that, in connection with the struggle for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the national bourgeoisie" and "abandoning class positions." This is wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the

national bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist".

24. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries" is justified by the fact that "objectively" they promote the cause of peace and weaken imperialism. The Chinese say that the policy should be "revised" on the ground that when the national bourgeoisie gains power it loses its ability to fight imperialism [India, Egypt, and Indonesia were cited] and "are themselves becoming imperialists."

25. The Soviets answer this by saying that it is necessary not to "skip stages in the revolution". To do so can cause "serious damage." It is essential to "look at the correlation of class forces." The "imperialists" try to exploit "splits in the national liberation movements". The Communists must try to increase their "friends" among the neutralists. This used to be the policy of the Chinese, with their slogan of "unity and struggle", but no longer.

26. The CPSU document said that it was necessary to exploit "contradictions in the enemy camp" and cited Lenin's statements on this subject. The Chinese argument that one should " ' not sit at the table with the imperialists' " is a denial of this Leninist policy.

27. The Soviets consider it essential not to minimize the military strength of the "imperialists" because to do so would make it impossible to "mobilize the masses against the threat of war."

28. The document denied that coexistence weakens the military ability of the "Socialist camp", and refuted Chinese insinuations at the WFTU meeting that disarmament proposals encouraged "illusions". The current Soviet approach to disarmament is "new". It is based on the belief that the Soviet policy would make it possible to create "broad popular fronts" and mass movements, and that it makes it difficult for "bellicose circles to intensify the arms race." The Soviet effort to get rid of U.S. overseas bases is a major aim of the disarmament campaign, and events in Japan have shown the effectiveness of Soviet policy. The Chinese are wrong to oppose the disarmament slogan and this opposition is in conflict with Soviet program. The Chinese concept of a "third way" which was put forward at the WFTU meeting means nothing less than continuation of the cold war, and of the arms race, and political difficulties for the peace policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that Communists want war.

29. Different Forms of Transition to Socialism. The CPSU document refuted the Chinese charge that the CPSU had been advocating the idea that the "peaceful way" was the "only way of transition." It cited ^{the} ~~that~~ 20th Congress thesis on this point and the statement in the 1957 Moscow Declaration. The Chinese, the document said, had apparently departed from their previous agreement with the CPSU, and if they no longer agreed, they should say so.

30. Chinese activities in the "international democratic organizations."

Within these international fronts the CPSU charged, the Chinese had been taking a separate position which made it difficult to arrive at decisions.

31. Within the World Peace Council, the Chinese had refused to vote on key resolutions.

32. At the IUS meeting at Tunis in February 1960, the Chinese had opposed "broader contacts with student organizations in capitalist countries" and had instead emphasized the need for "uncompromising struggle". At a WFDY meeting in March, and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground that the "call for disarmament lulls the popular masses and demobilizes them in the struggle against imperialism."

33. As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade unions in Peking, the Chinese had proposed " 'unfolding bitter struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries' " and formation of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This had been done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperialists" in their fight against the WFTU. The Chinese had later revised this attitude, the document said.

34. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent to the CPSU a report of the Communist fraction of the Chinese trade unions which agreed

with the WFTU positions. However, the Chinese were opposing WFTU decisions which applied to all countries. This caused trouble between the WFTU and some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese talk of WFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its ranks."

35. Chinese Divergence from the 1957 Declaration and Peace Manifesto.

The CPSU charged the Chinese with departing from the Moscow documents of 1957 on six main counts.

- (1) They had "revised" the characterization of the present "epoch" so as to make it read that this is "an epoch of wars and revolutions".
- (2) They say that the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence", as it is spelled out in the Moscow Declaration, creates "illusions" and that "peaceful coexistence is impossible; it only gratifies the imperialists and enables them to murder the peoples of Asia and Africa with impunity."
- (3) The Chinese say that the thesis in the Moscow Declaration that "the struggle for peace is the foremost task" of the Communist Parties is "erroneous and anti-Leninist" and that it encourages the "delusion that there can be peace with capitalism."
- (4) The Chinese reject the Moscow Declaration's thesis on "'different forms of transition'" as coming from an "'incorrect understanding of imperialism.'" "

(5) The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow Declaration

that the 20th CPSU Congress had opened " a new stage" in the international movement, and they want to reopen the question of the "cult of personality."

The Chinese had endorsed the CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin",

and Mao Tse-tung himself had done so at the 1957 Moscow meetings. The

new proposal to reopen the discussion "detracts from important Party

tasks, and weakens the struggle against the consequences of the cult of

personality" in some other parties, the document declared.

(6) In violation of the principle of correct "fraternal relations"

of Communist Parties, the Chinese have criticized Parties "behind their

backs". This criticism of the policies of the CPSU "does not contribute

to the prestige or unity" of the international movement. In particular, the

Chinese had disagreed with the November 1959 "Appeal" of seventeen West

European CPs and had called this document "opportunist". In this way,

the Soviets say, the Chinese have set themselves up as the "judges over the

group of most experienced parties", and they did it in the absence of these

at
parties at a meeting in Peking. In criticizing the CPSU itself, the Chinese

CP has not been direct, but has made use of "indirect methods and functionaries."

36. The Need for closer unity between the socialist camp and the inter-

national Communist movement. The CPSU document said that the Chinese

position threatens serious damage to the unity of the socialist camp and

that "many" Chinese actions have been "disloyal and uncomradely".

37. Although the Chinese say that the USSR should lead the "camp", behind the back of the CPSU, ^{through} they have attacked the CPSU, ~~utilizing~~ "trade union representatives, representatives of the national liberation movement and other representatives of the Communist parties." This shows a lack of "sincerity" and is a violation of the "principles of proletarian internationalism."

38. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed with the Chinese CP, but had not intervened: the "hundred flowers" program; the Chinese abandonment [in the commune program] of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under socialism. In Soviet eyes, "loyalty to Leninism is tested not only by words but by deeds", the document said, and it cited Soviet aid to the Chinese (15 billion rubles in deliveries and 6.6 billion rubles credit).

39. The document said that it was necessary and possible for the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets to be overcome "without compromising principles." The Chinese must take into account the "interests of the world Communist movement"; dissension can only benefit "imperialism the common enemy."

40. On 17 June, CPSU representatives met with CCP delegates en route to the Rumanian Party Congress. The Soviets told the Chinese that they

considered the latters' "views and methods erroneous." The Chinese refused to change their stand, but said that they would be willing to "admit their errors" if a majority at the Bucharest conference "proved" them to be wrong.

41. The CPSU document said that, in view of the fact that the issues in dispute had been defined in the Peace Manifesto of 1957, signed by all Communist Parties, the CPSU considered it necessary to exchange views with representatives of all the parties.

42. The document concluded with an expression of confidence that the CCP would "weigh our comradely criticism in a Marxist way and draw the necessary conclusions, bearing in mind the interests of the entire Socialist camp and the international Communist movement, which are inseparable from the interests of the building of Communism in the Chinese Peoples Republic."